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 PRAKASH SHAH
A REFLECTION ON THE SHARI’A DEBATE IN BRITAIN
Europeans are uncomfortable with their Muslim neighbours. The 
success of far right parties in the European Parliament elections, the 
referendum against minarets in Switzerland, and the consideration 
by the French authorities to ban the burqa, all in the year 2009, are 
cases in point. The Muslim presence has thus provoked questions about 
European liberal democracies and the limits of their tolerance of differ-
ence. Their presence in Europe is also forcing Muslims to re-evaluate 
many of the norms and practices they took for granted when living in 
their countries of origin. However, Muslims do not always give up 
their traditions, or they reconstruct them on European soil in ways that 
other Europeans cannot easily accept1. This includes practices which 
are beginning to more directly challenge European notions of the unity 
of nation-state legal orders. Thus, the prospect of the shari’a (Islamic 
law) gaining recognition within European legal systems is a matter 
fraught with controversy. This is especially so in the United Kingdom 
where the debate about Muslims has often centred on the shari’a. 
While there was some public discussion of the shari’a previously (Shah 
2010), on 7 February 2008, the head of the Church of England, the 
1 I do not mean to suggest that Muslims are new to Europe since they have had a notable 
presence in South East Europe for centuries. Even in Britain, the Muslim presence has been 
recorded for centuries (Ansari 2004). 
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Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, gave a speech at the 
Royal Courts of Justice in London in which he appeared to back some 
sort of ofﬁcial recognition for shari’a2. This article is a response to the 
Archbishop’s lecture or, more precisely, it responds to the ﬁerce criti-
cism levelled against the Archbishop for suggesting that it was inevi-
table that shari’a norms would gain greater recognition within English 
law. It brieﬂy recounts the history of recognition of shari’a in areas 
under the jurisdiction of Europeans, arguing that the mere prospect of 
recognition of Islamic law is not as strange or odd as has been made 
out. The article then goes on to outline the content of the Archbishop’s 
speech and the responses to it. It then moves to consider the limited 
ways in which English law has already adapted to some ethnic minority 
norms, and examines the prospects for greater ﬂexibility and openness 
to non-European norm systems in the contemporary context of ethnic 
and religious plurality. 
LEGAL PLURALITY: STANDARD OR EXCEPTIONAL?
The UK is not the only ethnically or religiously diverse country. 
This is a general condition of the world. From a socio-legal perspec-
tive, the claim of a uniform, national system of law is less and less 
sustainable in either the UK or elsewhere. In Asia and Africa, state 
legal systems have accommodated plurality by institutionally recog-
nizing a multiplicity of personal laws, running concurrent to a general 
law which applies to all of a country’s citizens (Hooker 1975). There 
are also cases in Latin America of accommodation of the legal orders 
of different population groups by state legal systems. States in Europe 
therefore appear to be running counter to globally preferred models of 
state–society relations.
2 The speech can be found at http//www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575 and is linked 
to a fairly long question-and-answer session which followed it http//www.archbishopofcan-
terbury.org/1594. An interview was recorded earlier the same day for the BBCs World at 
One, the transcript for which is available at http//www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1573. 
[All accessed 22 December 2009] The Archbishop’s speech was the ﬁrst in a series of discus-
sions by experts held on Islam and English law at the Temple Church in London. 
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When we examine the imperial period, we ﬁnd that the co-exist-
ence of different laws was readily conceded. As with other empires, 
the leaders of the British Empire had to recognize their domains as 
legally plural. The importance of rule over millions of Muslim subjects 
appeared to require reminders even at the peak of the imperial period. 
One Orientalist adventurer, Sir Richard Burton, wrote in the introduc-
tion to his 1885 translation of Alf Laylah wa Laylah (A Thousand and 
One Nights) that ‘England is ever forgetting that she is at present the 
greatest Mohammedan empire in the world’ (Burton 1894: xxiii). He 
further counselled:
Now Moslems are not to be ruled by raw youths who should be at school 
and college instead of holding positions of trust and emolument. He who 
would deal with them successfully must be, ﬁrstly, honest and truthful 
and, secondly, familiar with and favourably inclined to their manners and 
customs if not to their law and religion.
India is often cited by informed observers (Grifﬁths 1986:6), and 
not least by informed Muslims, as a country where the colonial authori-
ties recognized Muslim law. Such reminders appear to be necessary 
particularly given the state of post-imperial nationalist amnesia in 
which British legal systems appear to be currently languishing. In fact, 
before European colonizers arrived, there was already the prevailing 
norm of local laws existing side by side with the state law. Muslim kazi 
(or qadi) courts were established in the signiﬁcant cities under Muslim 
rule (Hasan 2004) although their powers were subsequently removed 
in those areas of the Empire which came under direct British control 
(Vatuk 2008), signalling the increasing control of the development of 
Muslim law through the British court system. However, it should be 
noted that while the British imperial authorities tended to some extent 
to recognize Muslim law in areas where Muslims lived in signiﬁcant 
numbers, such recognition was never extended to the imperial centre 
itself. While this may not have posed many problems in earlier decades, 
it has become an increasingly important issue with the magnitude of 
post-war immigration.
72 PRAKASH SHAH
In earlier times, British administrators were well aware of how 
foreign countries operated plural systems. Territories under Muslim rule 
were organised along segmented lines, something which is still often 
cited as evidence of Muslim plurality-consciousness. The vast Ottoman 
Empire, building upon Roman and Byzantine principles, employed the 
concept of millet which is generally understood as having been applica-
ble to the empire’s non-Muslim communities who were recognized as 
having considerable powers of self-regulation. However, semi-autono-
mous status was also recognized in other ways. Muslim communities 
(notably the Kurds) were also recognized as having considerable self-
regulatory freedom. Although post-imperial, modern Turkey has chosen 
to homogenize top-down along French lines, one can see the continuing 
inﬂuence of the earlier modelling on many existing West Asian/Middle 
Eastern legal systems (Dupret et al 1999, Mallat 2007), including that 
of Israel, which also recognizes a Muslim personal law and qadi courts 
to apply it (Edelman 1994). In Greece, meanwhile, shari’a is still recog-
nized with respect to the Muslims of Western (Greek) Thrace in conse-
quence of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) (Tsitselkis 2004).
Nowadays, the Austro-Hungarian Empire is recalled as the eastern-
most bulwark of the civilization formerly known as Christendom – 
against the Muslim world in particular.3 This idea can be seen even 
in recent works introducing the Austrian legal system (Hausmaninger 
2000: 1), and that historical baggage partially accounts for the refusal 
of Austria to countenance the accession of Turkey to the EU4. However, 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire had a highly plural population and legal 
structures. After its takeover of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, the Austro-
Hungarian Empire recognized the continued operation of shari’a courts 
as inherited from the Ottomans (Pinson 1993), a system which continued 
until the establishment of the Yugoslav Republic (Friedman 1996:72). 
Interestingly, the legal remains of those earlier days have been found by 
3 The term ‘Christendom’ persisted until recently in the usage of British courts, see e.g. 
Cheni v Cheni [1963] 2 W.L.R. 17, Qureshi v Qureshi [1972] Fam. 173 at 182 (used by 
counsel in argument). Because of citation and quoting of earlier cases, it can be found up to 
the present day. 
4 Hungary, on the other hand, has announced that it favours Turkey’s accession. 
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the Austrians, not more than two decades ago, to be useful in according 
ofﬁcial legal status to Muslims living there (Schmied and Wieshaider 
2004:202-204).
After the experience of colonisation, many countries retained their 
systems of law, somewhat along the lines of what the Archbishop of 
Canterbury termed ‘supplementary jurisdictions’, or personal laws. 
Nowadays, the vast majority of the world’s legal systems are not disin-
tegrating because they fail to operate a uniform legal system applica-
ble to all of their population. Indeed, the opposite may be the case: 
countries that came under the inﬂuence of European-style nationalist 
theories may ﬁnd themselves experiencing ethnic conﬂict or seces-
sionist pressure because of the non-recognition of constituent group 
identities. Elites from these states, among them many lawyers reared in 
models of Euro-focused, methodologically nationalist legality, never-
theless tend to downplay the extent to which ‘their’ legal systems make, 
or should make, concessions to diversity (Grifﬁths 1986:7-8).
Even in Euro-American legal systems, particularly the Europe-
an settler colonial states, there are instances of concessions to local 
socio-legal realities. The Canadian accommodations to First Nations 
people are one example; furthermore Australians are experimenting 
with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms drawing on indigenous 
Australian legal precepts. Under current constitutional arrangements in 
the UK, different state laws operate in England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. The effects of European law are another example of 
legal pluralism in British law, and here we see a series of backlash-
es against too much Euro-interference. This may partly be put down 
to the fact that EU law asserts a supremacy over British law, as the 
reception of ‘European law’ in the British Isles is otherwise centuries 
old. The EU’s neo-imperial legal order thus necessitates a continually 
sensitive approach to carefully reconciling its inherent legal plurality. 
Still, everywhere in Europe, the Muslim presence is leading to changes 
in ofﬁcial laws and practices. As Rohe (2009: 93) states, ‘Sharia has 
entered European parliaments, administrations and courts’. Perhaps 
more than in other Western countries the issue of shari’a has come 
more to the fore in Britain.
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THE WILLIAMS AFFAIR
The Rushdie Affair (1989) which erupted in response to the publi-
cation of the novel the Satanic Verses was one of the ﬁrst occasions 
where Muslim concern came onto the public scene in post-war Britain5. 
The Archbishop of Canterbury’s speech of 7 February 2008 came 
after a series of events which have kept the Muslim presence in the 
public frame since the Rushdie Affair. Although the main title of his 
lecture was ‘Civil and Religious Law in England’, Dr Williams used the 
opportunity to set out his thoughts regarding ‘what might be entailed in 
crafting a just and constructive relationship between Islamic law and 
the statutory law of the United Kingdom’. He was careful to say that 
the relevance of his argument was not restricted to Muslims, but more 
generally to people with a religious conviction. However, he also noted, 
‘Among the manifold anxieties that haunt the discussion of the place of 
Muslims in British society, one of the strongest, reinforced from time 
to time by the sensational reporting of opinion polls, is that Muslim 
communities in this country seek the freedom to live under sharia law.’ 
Concerns among Muslims were therefore at the heart of Dr Williams’ 
speech.
Responding to this felt desire he suggested that there were two possi-
ble levels at which a new relationship could be recast. At one level he 
asked whether there should be (and clearly he thought that there should 
be) a ‘higher level of attention to religious identity and communal 
rights in the practice of law’. At another level he foresaw ‘something 
like a delegation of certain legal functions to the religious courts of 
a community’. Dr Williams envisaged a ‘much enhanced and quite 
sophisticated version’ of the Islamic Shari’a Council, with ‘increased 
resource and a high degree of community recognition’. For Dr Williams 
this system of ‘supplementary jurisdiction’ would include the ﬁelds of 
marital law, ﬁnancial transactions, and authorized structures of media-
5 On the response by the ofﬁcial courts to the claim by some Muslims that the blasphemy 
law be applied in this case see R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p. Choud-
hury [1991] 1 All ER 306 eventually leading to a challenge at Strasbourg, Choudhury v UK, 
Appl. no. 17439/90 (1991) Human Rights Law Journal 172, Eur. Comm. H.R. 
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tion and conﬂict resolution. He drew upon the concept of ‘transforma-
tive accommodation’ proposed by the Canadian Jewish scholar, Ayelet 
Shachar (2001), as the core academic basis for his own thoughts on the 
interaction between religious and state dispute resolution mechanisms.
Shachar’s is a very compelling discussion of the problem of multi-
cultural societies in which religious groups, which she refers to as nomoi 
or ‘identity’ groups, share a comprehensive world view which extends 
to creating a law for the community which differs from that encoded in 
state law. Although mainly discussing religious groups, Shachar’s nomoi 
group could be any identity group organized along ethnic, racial, tribal 
or national-origin lines. Identifying a lack of discussion in the literature 
on multicultural societies on the ‘rougher business’ of the institutional 
allocation of power and structural design, she proposes a concept of 
‘multicultural jurisdictions’. Crucial to this is the allocation of sub-mat-
ters (for example, immigration, family, criminal) to the jurisdiction of 
nomoi groups, with the proviso that neither the nomoi group nor the state 
would enjoy a monopoly of decision-making over the allocated matters. 
Instead, she foresees cooperation and competition between state and 
community decision-makers so that both have to work harder to win the 
support of their constituents. Although an allocation of power between 
the two realms of law would have to be decided beforehand to prevent 
opt outs at the slightest opportunity, she also advocates the possibility 
of selective exit by individuals where remedies are not being provided 
to them. One advantage Shachar foresees in her proposal is that identity 
groups would not thereby have to retreat into a ‘reactive culturalism’ 
because of the threat of assimilation into the dominant culture, while 
those made vulnerable by the impact of the decisions of the groups’ 
leaders could also be protected.
Drawing closely on Shachar’s argument, Dr Williams advocated 
that litigants be offered a choice of forum as between communal or 
state legal mechanisms. In the process, both agencies would be trans-
formed into recognizing their own limits: the former jurisdiction would 
have to take into account ‘the risks of alienating its own people by 
inﬂexible and over-restrictive applications of traditional law’, while 
the latter would need to ‘weigh the possible consequences of ghettoiz-
ing and effectively disenfranchizing a minority, at real cost to overall 
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social cohesion and creativity’. As in the case of shared responsibility in 
education6, such competition for loyalty could ensure that groups with 
‘serious and profound conviction are not systematically faced with the 
stark alternatives of cultural loyalty or state loyalty’.
In order to achieve this, Dr Williams argued, there was a need to rethink 
the rule and role of law according to which citizenship is premised on 
a monopolistic abstract legal universality in which individuals live under 
a rights-based culture ‘irrespective of the custom and conscience of those 
groups which concretely compose a plural modern society’. Rather, in his 
view, the Enlightenment achievement needs to be recast in a negative way, 
as a guarantee of equal accountability and access, whereby any human 
participant is protected against the loss of certain elementary liberties of 
self-determination and guaranteed the freedom to demand reasons from 
others for actions and policies which infringe that self-determination. 
This way of reconceptualizing the rule of law would honour ‘what in the 
human constitution is not captured by any one form of corporate belong-
ing or any particular history, even though the human constitution never 
exists without those other determinations’.
Besides addressing the perceived dilution of Enlightenment achieve-
ments, Dr Williams dealt with two other possible objections to his 
proposal. The ﬁrst involves the question of vexatious appeal to religious 
scruple, to which his response is to have a method of separating those 
claims where the ‘potential conﬂict is real, legally and religiously serious’ 
from those which are ‘grounded in either nuisance or ignorance’. The 
second possible problem with the recognition of ‘supplementary juris-
diction’ could be the reinforcing in minority communities of repressive 
and retrograde elements, ‘with particularly serious consequences for 
the role and liberties of women’. He gave the examples of inheritance 
for widows and apostasy in Islamic law. In such cases he felt that a legal 
system could not allow the taking away of rights and liberties that 
individuals were allowed to enjoy or claim as citizens, and so religious 
6 English education law recognizes denominational schools which can operate under 
different structures reﬂecting different levels of state support and intervention. Around 
a third of all schools within the state maintained sector in England have a religious character 
(Department for Children Schools and Families 2007:3). 
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courts could not be given a ﬁnal say. There were, in other words, to be 
‘no blank cheques’.
Perhaps predictably, the reaction against this speech was immediate 
and forceful among different sections of society and exposed a range 
of ideological positions held by those who fear a threat to the clasp by 
which Christianity is held in place in the constitutional system (‘Britain 
is a Christian country’); those who fear that religion is rearing its ugly 
head in a time when secular beliefs are making rapid advances within 
society at large, and within the ofﬁcial legal framework; and those who 
suspected ulterior motives behind the speech. Among some other minor-
ity communities there is a palpable sense that, once again, Muslims 
are dominating the public agenda while some Muslims also feel that 
the Archbishop’s position did not reﬂect theirs. Directed as the speech 
was to the ofﬁcial legal system’s need to adapt to changing social reali-
ties, many of the governing assumptions about the system of law came 
to the surface in response to it. There was vociferous defence of the 
prevailing order (whether properly regarded as secular or Christian). 
The ‘fact’ that only one law could and should govern Britain’s popula-
tion was expressed most loudly in the aftermath of Dr Williams’ speech. 
Meanwhile, a number of moderate voices also expressed themselves as 
not entirely dismissing Dr Williams’ suggestions, and this was particu-
larly notable among the published views of legal professionals to whom 
the speech had, after all, been addressed (Ballantyne 2008, Botsford 
2008, Dyke 2008, Smith 2008, Turner 2008).
The Williams Affair was not the ﬁrst occasion during which the 
operation of shari’a had been discussed. For the better part of the post-
war period which has seen signiﬁcant Muslim settlement in Britain, 
campaigns for recognition of rules of shari’a in family matters have 
taken a rather low proﬁle, although they have not disappeared from the 
agenda altogether. Consistent rejection by state ofﬁcials of the prospect 
of shari’a being recognized has probably reinforced quietistic endeav-
ours in the private ﬁeld whereby informal and hybrid rule systems have 
arisen noted by Pearl and Menski (1998) as the socio-legal phenom-
ena of angrezi shariat (British Muslim law). The existence of ofﬁcial-
ly unregulated so-called ‘shari’a councils’ had been coming under 
scrutiny in the months preceding the Archbishop’s intervention (Shah 
78 PRAKASH SHAH
2010)7. Such councils are frequently referred to as ‘Muslim courts’ but, 
although ofﬁcial courts and tribunals have been aware of their opera-
tion, their decisions are not given ofﬁcial status8.
Once Dr Williams had taken the proverbial bull by the horns, writers 
who had not yet traversed the territory of shari’a to any signiﬁcant extent 
began to take notice of the need to enter the arena. For instance, the leading 
sociologist Tariq Modood (2005) has been discussing the struggles for 
recognition by Muslims within the context of ofﬁcial British multicultur-
alism, inter alia, under the anti-discrimination law, the racial hatred laws, 
more visible recognition within the census ﬁgures, and state recognition of 
Muslim denominational schools. However, Modood had rarely addressed 
the shari’a issue, giving the impression that it was of negligible concern 
among Muslims, but has since also responded to Dr Williams’ speech and 
incorporated it within his concept of ‘multicultural citizenship’ (Modood 
2008). Signiﬁcantly, the then Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 
Lord Phillips, having chaired the Archbishop’s speech, entered the discus-
sion himself, taking a position sympathetic to the Archbishop’s in a lecture 
at the London Muslim Centre on 3 July 20089. While there is some space 
which separates the positions taken by Dr Williams and Lord Phillips, the 
fact that a senior judge, soon to take the position of the President of the 
UK’s newly created Supreme Court, seems to (cautiously) indicate his 
support for the Archbishop’s idea of a choice of jurisdictions, was proba-
bly unparalleled among the European judiciary.
SHARI’A AND ENGLISH LAW
The legal adaptation of European societies to the encounter between 
North and South occasioned by large-scale and continuing immigration 
from outside Europe is an ongoing process, with the shari’a debate only 
7 Lively debates among Muslims have been taking place in various fora, a sampling of 
which can be seen on the Channel 4 series Sharia TV. 
8 This is subject to what is said further below on the effect of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
9 See the website of the East London Mosque and London Muslim Centre where the 
text of Lord Phillips’ speech can also be found: http://www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/, last 
accessed 26 December 2009. 
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the latest in a long list of struggles for what Modood (2005) describes 
as ‘multicultural citizenship’. For some time, British laws have made 
minor legal concessions to minority communities. Since the mid-1970s, 
a statutory exemption has been made to Sikhs who wish to be exempt 
from wearing crash helmets while riding motorcycles and several other 
individual examples can be mentioned, including some speciﬁc conces-
sions applicable to Muslims in legislation and case law (Menski 2008). 
This methodology of responding to the individual facts and circum-
stances of cases and the need for exemptions in general laws seems to 
have worked up to a point, and is a further indication that a total prescrip-
tion of legal uniformity is never desirable in a plural society. Shachar 
(2001) speaks of a speciﬁc manifestation of this model as ‘temporal 
accommodation’ whereby time bound (related to life cycle events) and 
issue speciﬁc measures are accepted ofﬁcially as being governed by 
a group’s traditions. Shachar’s (2001:101) criticism of such a model of 
accommodation is that the costs and efforts of establishing a claim for 
validity falls ‘upon the vulnerable group members who must negotiate 
their rights on a case-to-case basis, and often against ingrained preju-
dices and suspicions regarding their nomoi groups’ traditions’.
In the British case, too, such accommodation appears to have 
operated largely unsystematically and without a more comprehensive 
constitutional commitment to build in the legal requirements of differ-
ent communities and individuals in an ethnically plural society. Eventu-
ally, the larger question about a paradigmatically different approach 
appears to present itself. Rather than insisting on the historically fairly 
recent model of legal equality within which some exceptions are made, 
often through a happenstance combination of circumstances, should we 
instead be talking of a generalized right to be different? There is no 
such right in any international human rights instrument although, as 
Ballard (2009) argues, that may well reﬂect the constrained nature of 
human rights lawmaking. However, the right to be different and to have 
that difference respected in law is a critical issue, and is underlined 
by the Archbishop’s references to plurality and pluralism. It goes far 
beyond the question of principles and rules of shari’a being recognized 
in British law. The issue is relevant not only for Muslims but for every-
one, since everyone is different from the ‘other’. Viewed in this light, 
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the Archbishop provokes us into thinking more deeply about the general 
implications of living in a plural society from a legal perspective. 
The Archbishop rightly views shari’a – literally the path to the 
source of water – as a methodology of arriving at a just answer to legal 
problems, and not simply a set of rules that can be applied mechani-
cally. Dr Williams stated:
Thus, in contrast to what is sometimes assumed, we do not simply have 
a standoff between two rival legal systems when we discuss Islamic and 
British law. On the one hand, sharia depends for its legitimacy not on any 
human decision, not on votes or preferences, but on the conviction that it 
represents the mind of God; on the other, it is to some extent unﬁnished 
business so far as codiﬁed and precise provisions are concerned. To recog-
nise sharia is to recognise a method of jurisprudence governed by revealed 
texts rather than a single system.
The substantive content of the shari’a is thus widely contested and 
internally plural albeit with many historical and contemporary trends. 
Some contemporary trends indicate a worrying reliance on extremist 
interpretations, thus giving rise to troubling scenes occasionally repre-
sented in the media and in the reports of human rights organisations. 
The thrust of Dr. Williams proposals can perhaps be better analyzed 
if we divide those with substantive implications from those having 
procedural implications. As noted, Dr Williams raised the question 
in his lecture of ‘a higher level of attention to religious identity and 
communal rights in the practice of the law’. Interpreted as having impli-
cations at the level of substantive law, this raises the issue of how legis-
lation and the ofﬁcial courts could incorporate issues of Islamic law. 
As may be expected, the present picture reveals an approach largely 
presenting Muslim law as a negative and unwanted inﬂuence on the 
ofﬁcial British legal systems. In some cases, Islam is seen and treated 
as the foreign ‘other’, or as Glenn (2003: 99) would say, a source of 
‘distant law’. The law concerning marriage has turned out to be a highly 
contested and somewhat confused ﬁeld in this respect. Indeed, in one 
case involving a Muslim nikah celebrated in London, the High Court 
judge referred to it as a marriage according to a foreign religion, thus 
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highlighting that some judges still do not see Islam as being part of 
the British way of life10. However, while steadfastly refusing to treat 
the London nikah as legally valid in English law, the judge went on to 
apply the principle of ‘presumption of marriage’ to validate this quite 
long-standing union, thereby also paving the way to awarding remedies 
to the divorcee woman11. In other instances, law making continues to 
proceed without attention to the requirements of ethnic minorities. Even 
though English judges have seen the utility of the Scottish law principle 
of ‘presumption of marriage’ in a series of ethnic minority cases, the 
Scottish Parliament has, without debate on the implications, disallowed 
courts from having recourse to the same principle by section 3 of the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006.
It has not gone unnoticed that marriages of Muslims and other ethnic 
minorities gain recognition much more easily in circumstances which 
entail penalties. Thus for the purposes of the Forced Marriage (Civil 
Protection) Act 2007 a marriage is deﬁned in section 16 as ‘any religious 
or civil ceremony of marriage (whether or not legally binding)’. This is 
reﬂective of an underlying tendency to view Muslims and other minority 
family arrangements as worthy of recognition in contexts where those 
arrangements are treated as deﬁcient by comparison to modern Europe-
an standards. It may be argued that the legislation in question, which 
allows individuals to approach the courts in cases of actual or potential 
forced marriage, is protective in nature and that the wider deﬁnition 
of marriage is therefore justiﬁed. While this is undoubtedly the case, 
we regularly ﬁnd that recognition is not forthcoming in other contexts 
where it could also result in protective mechanisms coming into play. 
In the recent and widely reported decision Radmacher v Granatino, in 
which the Court of Appeal recognized the relevance of a pre-nuptial 
agreement between a couple who had signed an agreement valid under 
German law and then divorced in the UK, the Court was seemingly 
10 A.M. v A.M. [2001] 2 FLR 6.
11 This kind of bending of English law rules on the recognition of marriage, also evident 
in the Sikh marriage case, Chief Adjudication Ofﬁcer v Kirpal Kaur Bath [2000] 1 F.C.R. 
419, [2000] 1 F.L.R. 8, [2000] Fam. Law 91, may be seen as illustrations of what Hoekema 
(2009) regards as ‘interlegality’. This amounts to the using of known principles of the estab-
lished domestic legal order to accommodate ethnic minority practices norms. 
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aware that the issue of the Muslim marriage contract was hovering in the 
background. Although there was no particular legal argument in court 
regarding Muslim marriage contracts, Lord Justice Thorpe somewhat 
gratuitously stated that ‘The gulf between our statute law and Sharia 
law is wide indeed’12. In the next paragraph, his Lordship stated,
in future cases broadly in line with the present case on the facts, the judge 
should give due weight to the marital property regime into which the parties 
freely entered. This is not to apply foreign law, nor is it to give effect to 
a contract foreign to English tradition13.
Although this paragraph is couched in non-speciﬁc, oblique terms, 
it may be guessed that his Lordship had Muslim marriage contracts in 
mind when referring to ‘a contract foreign to English tradition’14. While 
it is understandable that a court may not wish to be bound by the terms 
of a (pre-)nuptial contract completely, it is not necessarily the best of 
strategies to say or to hint that Muslim marriage contracts should not 
be given their due weight by virtue of the fact that they are outside the 
English legal tradition. This decision again reveals a kind of distancing 
strategy which may to be motivated by much more than the oft-given 
reason that secular Western judges will not want to get bogged down 
in religious questions. It also seems to ignore the utility of giving such 
marriage contracts some weight, subject to overriding public policy, if 
they open up prospects of gaining ﬁnancial compensation15.
12 Radmacher v Granatino [2009] EWCA Civ 649, Thorpe LJ, para. 52.
13 Radmacher v Granatino [2009] EWCA Civ 649, Thorpe LJ, para. 53.
14 Lord Justice Thorpe’s position may well have been inﬂuenced by an appeal the previ-
ous year in which he was on the bench. In City of Westminster Social & Community Services 
Department v IC and another [2008] EWCA Civ 198 the local authority had taken steps to 
prevent a man with severe impairment of intellectual functioning and autism from going 
ahead with his marriage to a woman from Bangladesh. The man had even been prevented 
from going abroad to begin his married life. The parties married by a transnational telephone 
marriage. Although there was expert evidence from Prof. Werner Menski that the marriage 
was valid under Muslim law and under Bangladeshi law, the Court of Appeal judges argued 
on various grounds that the marriage could not be held valid in English law. 
15 The issue of recognition gains more importance once we take into account the fact 
that many Muslim marriages in Britain are not being registered. Conversely, that fact may be 
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The concern to keep Muslim law at bay is evident in another paradig-
matic illustration of the courts’ seeming reluctance to enter into the 
religious sphere. The case concerned a bank loan dispute decided by the 
English Court of Appeal. In this case, Shamil Bank, the choice of court 
in the loan contract was an English court, but the clause stipulating the 
law to govern the contract referred to the ‘glorious shari’a’16. Despite 
the submission of expert evidence on both sides explaining the Islamic 
rules on banking and the taking of interest, the Court of Appeal decided 
the matter solely on the basis of English law. Among the reasons given 
were that Islamic rules were really only religious principles and far 
too imprecise to be applied, while the international rules applicable to 
contracts envisaged only the law of a particular state legal system. This 
view of shari’a as being couched in general principles is not unknown 
among experts of Islamic law (Vikør 2005:1-2), and was also reﬂect-
ed in the Archbishop’s remarks about shari’a being an ‘unﬁnished 
business’. This is particularly the case when the principles of Muslim 
law are contended to apply to situations, like bank loans, which call for 
fresh answers to problems arising in contemporary circumstances. We 
are therefore bound to ﬁnd much ‘unﬁnished business’ in such contexts, 
but is this open texture a ground for saying that we ought simply to 
apply the better-known principles and rules of English law? It remains 
to be seen how the British courts get actively involved in deciding about 
their own approach to particular questions of shari’a, rather than stand-
ing back or avoiding issues in the manner demonstrated in the cases 
discussed here17.
preventing some judges from actively conferring recognition in the knowledge that it effec-
tively means recognizing marriages of persons who have neglected to follow the registration 
requirements of English law. Western courts are in general adopting a variety of approaches 
to the Muslim nikah given the multiplicity of concerns (Fournier 2010).  
16 Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd (No.1) [2004] 1 WLR 1784.
17 A stipulation in a will that property of the deceased be distributed according to 
shari’a rules is another illustration of individual Muslims using a plurality of laws which 
could then put the onus on English law fora of deciding what the substantive shari’a rules are 
and whether to accept them. This issue already comes before the ofﬁcial courts as a matter 
of foreign law in private international law terms. For online will services see for example 
http://www.inter-islam.org/Actions/ISLAMICWILL.htm and http://www.islamwills.com/ 
both last accessed 27 December 2009. 
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Besides the question of incorporation of aspects of substantive 
Muslim law into English or British laws, the Archbishop’s reference to 
the possible ‘delegation of certain legal functions to the religious courts 
of a community’ raised issues of a more procedural nature and, in partic-
ular, the nature of judicial decision-making in Muslim contexts and its 
possible interface with English law. Muslim judicial decision-making 
has long been stereotyped as kadijustiz, to repeat the phrase used by 
Max Weber (1954:351)18, later adapted by Anglo-American judges to 
draw a picture of a rather arbitrary, irrational system of dispute process-
ing under trees19. This ignores the complex hybridity and context sensi-
tivity that enters into Muslim decision-making. Studies on decision-
making by judges in contemporary Muslim contexts by scholars such as 
Lawrence Rosen (1989, 2000 on Morocco), Karim Wazir Jahan (1992, 
on Malaysia), Lynn Welchman (2000, on Palestine) and Susan Hirsch 
(1994, in Kenya, where Muslims are a minority), as well as a number of 
historical studies (Peirce 2003, Hasan 2004), reveal a number of impor-
tant facets of this kind of judging activity.
Judges are required to be as alive to the socio-legal reality of the 
disputants as to the Islamic doctrines in which they have been schooled. 
This involves their taking into account not just the ﬁqh jurisprudence 
as developed by scholars over time but also the socio-cultural norms by 
which disputants live. As Welchman (2000:6) remarks in her book on 
the West Bank, ‘Customary rules frequently constitute a stronger force 
than «law», particularly over matters involving women and the family.’ 
It is also notable that the customer base of Muslim courts, including 
shari’a councils in Britain (Shah-Kazemi 2001, Bano 2007, Keshavjee 
2007), substantially consists of women, while judges are of course men. 
No doubt, this introduces its own gender-laden dynamic. It is, however, 
difﬁcult to conceive of any courts, Muslim or otherwise, changing social 
structures by themselves. The best that they can achieve is to help make 
the life conditions of people who come before them tolerable. Muslim 
18 The term may not be Max Weber’s however, but may have been coined by R. Schmidt 
in 1908 – see Manzoor (2000). 
19 Metropolitan Properties Co Ltd v Purdy [1940] 1 All ER 188, per Lord Goddard CJ; 
Terminiello v Chicago 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949), per Frankfurter J dissenting. 
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courts, or our home-grown version, the ‘shari’a councils’, are probably 
as ill placed fully to live up to the concerns expressed, especially by 
feminist scholars, in relation to their ability to overcome patriarchal 
social structures. The best we may realistically expect of them is that 
they alleviate their worst effects and then throw the rest back on to the 
socio-legal sphere to right its own wrongs and for state policy to play 
its role effectively. This is not to argue against judicial activism, which 
I favour, but to acknowledge that any such activism must necessarily be 
contained by socio-legal realism.
The Archbishop’s position may be regarded as having merit because 
it could allow ofﬁcial courts greater oversight of shari’a councils. In 
particular, it could provide the state legal system with a control mecha-
nism over their activities. Under present arrangements, shari’a councils 
operate in an unregulated manner and as noted their decisions are not 
binding in English law20. The Arbitration Act of 1996 offers an operable 
method of interface between arbitration bodies and the ofﬁcial courts 
so that an arbitration entered into voluntarily can be either enforced or 
challenged in the ofﬁcial courts. The Jewish rabbinical courts, the Batei 
Din (sing. Beth Din), have been using this mechanism in Britain for 
decades, but Muslims have not so far used it extensively. The Arbitration 
Act in any case does not cover divorce or other family matters except 
for inheritance. Given that the main work done by shari’a councils 
concerns divorce matters it is probable that, unless the legislation is 
changed or the practice of shari’a councils in Britain extends more 
and more to other matters, direct interface with the ofﬁcial courts will 
remain minimal. Certain bodies, speciﬁcally the network established by 
the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, are gearing up to use the Arbitration 
Act more effectively, and Lord Phillips, in his speech of July 2008, also 
seemed to favour this as a workable option.
Developments in Ontario have taken a reverse direction. The exist-
ing mechanisms under the arbitration legislation in Ontario which, 
20 This is somewhat in contrast to the perception in sections of the British and European 
media that shari’a councils have an ofﬁcial legal status. In the aftermath of the Archbishop 
of Canterbury’s speech, several European journalists who had contacted me were under the 
impression that they had indeed obtained ofﬁcial status. 
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unlike the British model, covered family matters, were buttressed after 
it was realized that Muslim bodies too would be using those mecha-
nisms to allow ofﬁcial legal force to be given to their awards. Jews 
and Catholics had been doing so for some time already. New legisla-
tion in the form of the Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005 was 
passed, requiring that only decisions made in accordance with Canadi-
an laws be made enforceable, and Muslim bodies not achieving compli-
ance with this legislation would simply not be recognized in ofﬁcial 
terms (Bakht 2006, Bader 2009). However, such attempts at controlling 
Muslim arbitrations or applying Muslim law rules in ofﬁcial courts do 
not necessarily mean that religious arbitrations would cease. As Marion 
Boyd told us on her visit to London in July 2009, the Ontario legisla-
tion has resulted in Muslim arbitrations merely becoming invisible to 
ofﬁcial law without ceasing operations21. 
In India, some ulema have for decades been irritated at interventions 
by legislators and courts in questions of Muslim law, and may even 
prefer them to stay out of decision-making in Muslim matters altogeth-
er. Such purported protection of a group’s authentic interest, termed 
by Shachar as a form of ‘reactive culturalism’, is hardly realistic since 
states would, and arguably should, want to ensure that certain controls 
and checks are applied. Such control may also be useful in other senses. 
In the British case, it could lift angrezi shariat out of its conﬁnement to 
the unofﬁcial sphere and quicken its development by allowing British 
courts to also have a say in its shaping. In other words, it could make 
shariat more angrezi, partly by stimulating the kind of ‘transforma-
tive accommodation’ to which Shachar and Dr Williams refer. This 
might also act as a signal to other European countries, assuming they 
do not consider the concessions to Muslims in Britain to have gone far 
enough already. Expert European legal commentators (Ferrari 2000:5, 
Rohe 2006:61, Rohe 2009:99-100) have not welcomed the possibility 
21 Marion Boyd, ‘The past, present and future of arbitration in religious contexts: Reﬂec-
tions on Ontario law in comparative a context’. Lecture given at the Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies, London, 10 July 2009. The 2005 legislation in fact overrode proposals made 
by Marion Boyd’s report for which see: http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/
about/pubs/boyd/, last accessed 27 December 2009. 
87A REFLECTION ON THE SHARI’A DEBATE IN BRITAIN
of some type of personal law system being implemented on grounds of 
the potential disturbance to the established constitutional order. 
It ought to be noted that it is not clear whom the Archbishop had 
consulted prior to making his views public. Certainly, no Muslim 
organization appears to have made a well-argued case for itself or 
for principles of shari’a to be ofﬁcially recognized. There have been 
general demands in the past for the recognition of shari’a particular-
ly in family matters and such demands have resurfaced from time to 
time or appear in survey evidence. However, this is far from making 
a good argument for why shari’a should be recognized ofﬁcially and 
what the mechanisms of any such recognition should be. It may well be 
that some Muslim organizations and clerics, as in India, do not want to 
see shari’a rules and bodies being controlled by the state too closely. 
They may see the British state as being far too hostile and untrustwor-
thy in this respect anyway, particularly in the tense post-9/11 climate. 
The relative public silence may also reﬂect the narrowness of their own 
training and outlook, engendered through the barrenness of the contem-
porary curricula in madrassas. Olivier Roy (2008) has suggested that, 
with the extension of the secular educational sphere in South Asian 
Muslim countries, madrassas have adopted very narrowly ﬁqh-focused 
curricula whereas in times past they would have a much more holistic 
approach to education (see also Dalrymple 2005). This raises the wider 
issue of the corpus of knowledge the functionaries of shari’a councils 
would be applying. The question of education is of signiﬁcance to the 
‘secular’ law schools of Europe too.
EDUCATIONAL PRIORITIES
Beyond the practical questions of dispute-solving and integrating 
shari’a within the framework of ofﬁcially sanctioned legal practice there 
are some conceptual hurdles which would also need to be overcome. 
Without addressing this backdrop, the ground upon which the re-ad-
aptation of legal practices is to take place would remain unprepared. 
The concept of legal pluralism is particularly helpful in attenuating the 
ideological blockages of Enlightenment thinking. The Archbishop did 
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not actually use the phrase ‘legal pluralism’ but he clearly referred to 
several senses of the word ‘pluralism’ and, certainly, he can be classi-
ﬁed as a legal pluralist. At one level, legal pluralism can be seen as the 
presence of more than one legal order in a social ﬁeld (Moore 1978, 
Grifﬁths 1986). But it has received more complex deﬁnitions includ-
ing a compelling one by Menski (2006) who asks us to think about law 
as an inherently plural and dynamic phenomenon, not susceptible to 
exhaustive deﬁnition by any one of the positivist, natural law, or socio-
logical methods, but really needing a combination of all approaches to 
be able to ‘see’ how it works.22 This kind of methodological pluralism 
would also help us to remain critical of the ofﬁcial legal mechanisms as 
well as the shari’a councils’ engagement with Muslim communities.
Legal pluralism brings out some of the most troubling and crucial 
challenges which face legal systems today, but which lie buried beneath 
a hubristic gloriﬁcation of uniﬁcation through law and the prioritization of 
nation-state laws (for example, Britain), national-state laws (for example, 
Scotland), or indeed inter-state laws, at the expense of allegedly lesser forms 
of social organization. We still shy away from teaching legal pluralism in 
jurisprudence courses in British universities because, possibly, we have 
acquired our own ‘legal socialization’ (Kourilsky-Augeven 2007), in types 
of jurisprudential thought which assume a homogenous national social whole 
as the only relevant form of social organization with any legal power.
It is not therefore enough for us to recognize ourselves as sexist or 
classist legal ideologues, but also as representing a particular national-
ist and ethno-centric perspectives. We are increasingly therefore called 
upon to stand back and analyse the nation as particularistic ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson 1983), and thereby recognize that it cannot 
represent itself, nor should it be represented as, offering a universalistic 
claim to truth or justice, often hiding behind liberal discourse which 
elevates individual autonomy and treats all other bonds as if they were 
stapled on by rational choice. According to this view, the bonds of 
kinship and religion would not be chosen by rational thinking individu-
als as if the worship of individual autonomy can liberate us from the 
22 Meanwhile, Menski has developed his earlier model further to incorporate a fourth 
dimension of international law. 
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oppression of kinship and religion. Dr Williams’ criticism of such 
positions is quite compelling23. Jurisprudence, the home of legal theory 
in British law schools, however, appears to have so far failed to lift the 
veil of nationalism and incorporate legal pluralism that would account 
for ‘other’ laws, or the laws of the non-national other. This picture is 
changing slowly as postmodernist writing increasingly looks back at 
the historical role of nationalist thinking in law. Roger Cotterrell (2009) 
has argued that the currently revered fathers of jurisprudence assume 
a homogenous, undifferentiated body of citizens, and so disregard or 
fail to account for the presence of the other in our midst. Implicitly, 
they assume also that this is a body of equal nationals within a nation 
with legal autonomy. As Moore (1978) tells us, it is more advisable 
to conceive of state law as a ‘semi-autonomous social ﬁeld’, whose 
‘limited degree of control and predictability is daily inﬂated in the folk 
models of lawyers and politicians all over the world’ (Moore 1978:2).
Cotterrell has been writing about notions of community as interme-
diate entities between nations and individuals, and indeed now writes 
about transnational communities and the law (Cotterrell 2008) whose 
legal role we are ill placed to analyse because of our methodological-
ly nationalist legal inheritance. The Archbishop’s concern also right-
ly focuses on how we can account for those nomoi groups who have 
little legitimation in the legal theoreticians’ pages or in the law of the 
nation. Historically such groups have been subdued by the nation, and 
it continues to ﬁght them now with discourses of social inclusion and 
community cohesion, which arise a priori, imagined and bound to be 
resisted by various means. Besides such discourses, there is the actual 
practice of extremely hostile immigration and other controls, and the 
examples from legal practice we have seen in this article.
Silvio Ferrari (2000:6) has argued in a book on Islam and European 
legal systems that we ought to be teaching about the laws of religions 
in universities. While this was an allusion to the increasing secularity 
in legal education nowadays, with religion at best a marginal add-on, 
Ferrari’s point was also that increasing knowledge about religious laws 
would have made us more receptive to the recently felt legal needs of 
23 See also Ballard (2009) for a critique of such methodological individualism. 
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Muslims of immigrant origin living in Europe. It is perhaps no coinci-
dence therefore that the author of the speech under discussion here is 
a scholarly priest, already highly sensitized to the needs of the religious 
conscience in humans. Besides the teaching of religion and law, the 
teaching of Islamic law might also have to be considered. We do not 
teach Islamic law in British universities to any appreciable degree, 
particularly within law schools. The School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS) in London and Warwick University (under the guidance 
of Prof. Shaheen Ali) are among the only places where Islamic law is 
offered as part of an undergraduate curriculum within a law department. 
Otherwise, much energy is spent discussing hijabs, niqabs and jilbabs 
and whether Muslim women should or should not be allowed to wear 
them, but there does not yet appear to be appropriate respect for the fact 
that Islamic law is a well-established ﬁeld, older than the common law 
(which arguably draws upon some of the methodology of Muslim law 
(Glenn 2007:227-9)), with its own global claims.
It is not that the demand for studying Islamic law is not there. I have 
(predominantly Muslim) students appearing every year who want to 
research some topic connected to it within the space allowed to them 
in the curriculum through dissertations or theses. Not having had any 
grounding in Muslim legal history, the principles of Muslim law or 
indeed exposure to any non-Euro-centred comparative law, few such 
students are well placed to write on Islamic law issues. While one may 
concede that there is some intensity of discussion on Islamic banking 
that may be explained by its obvious economic attractions, and does 
not extend to detailed coverage of other areas. Meanwhile, as teach-
ers, we tend to ﬁnd it easier to communicate the misogynistic elements 
of Muslim law, to be inevitably out-trumped by the superior claims 
of modern, secular, individualistic and methodologically nationalist, 
human rights perspectives.
CONCLUSION
Currently, we appear to be in a strange and largely unexplored 
landscape, with senior religious ﬁgures and other state ofﬁcers, as well 
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as a number of academics and legal practitioners, discussing the legal 
implications of the large-scale Muslim presence in Britain. There is deep 
unease about the matters being raised, let alone about what directions 
ofﬁcial legal systems should be taking to constructively respond to the 
question of shari’a. Dr Williams’ foray into the shari’a debate may have 
lasting implications, and it may be regarded as part of a longer-term 
strategy of reorienting the inter-relationship of Islamic law and British 
legal systems. It can only be a long-term strategy since contemporary 
conditions appear to be determined by legal nationalism and these will 
not be easily shaken off, even though it may be easy enough to argue 
academically for seeing things from different viewpoints. However, the 
future looks interesting.
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REFLEKSJA NA TEMAT BRYTYJSKIEJ DEBATY O PRAWIE SZARIATU
Streszczenie
Europejczycy czują się coraz mniej komfortowo mając muzułma-
nów za sąsiadów. Niedawne wydarzenia z 2009 r.: sukces skrajnej prawicy 
w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego, referendum w sprawie minare-
tów w Szwajcarii oraz rozważanie wprowadzenia zakazu noszenia burek we 
Francji – to najlepsze przykłady tego stanu rzeczy. Obecność muzułmanów 
rodzi zatem pytania o europejskie demokracje i granice tolerancji jakie wyzna-
czają one w kwestii odmienności. Obecność w Europie zmusza także samych 
muzułmanów do rewizji wielu norm i praktyk, które przyjmowali za pewnik 
w krajach, z których pochodzą. Mimo to, muzułmanie nie zawsze rezygnują 
ze swoich tradycji lub też próbują odtwarzać je na europejskiej ziemi, co dla 
wielu Europejczyków nie jest łatwe do zaakceptowania. Praktyki te w sposób 
coraz bardziej bezpośredni kwestionują europejskie pojęcie wspólnoty 
porządków prawnych typowych dla państw jednonarodowościowych. Stąd, 
perspektywa uznania szariatu (prawa islamskiego) jako składowej europej-
skich systemów prawnych budzi wiele kontrowersji. Jest to szczególnie 
widoczne w Wielkiej Brytanii, gdzie dyskusja na temat muzułmanów skupia 
się często na tej kwestii. Chociaż publiczna debata na temat prawa szariatu 
miała miejsce już wcześniej, 7 lutego 2008 r. głowa Kościoła anglikańskie-
go, arcybiskup Canterbury, dr Rowan Williams, wygłosił mowę w Sądzie 
Królewskim w Londynie, w której wydawał się popierać pewne rozwiązania 
w sprawie oﬁcjalnego uznania szariatu. Niniejszy artykuł jest odpowiedzią na 
wykład arcybiskupa, a konkretnie na gwałtowną krytykę, z jaką spotkało się 
jego wystąpienie, w którym sugerował, iż nie da się uniknąć szerszego uznania 
norm szariatu w angielskim prawie. Artykuł przedstawia zwięzłą historię 
poszanowania prawa szariatu na obszarach pozostających pod władzą sądow-
niczą europejczyków i uzasadnia, iż sama perspektywa uznania prawa islamu 
nie jest czymś nieznanym lub dziwnym, jak to się próbuje przedstawiać. Dalej 
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artykuł omawia treść przemówienia arcybiskupa Canterbury i zajmuje wobec 
niego stanowisko. Następnie, autor rozpatruje przypadki, w których angielskie 
prawo w ograniczony sposób przejęło już pewne normy mniejszości etnicz-
nych i zastanawia się nad tym, czy istnieje perspektywa większej elastyczności 
i otwartości na pozaeuropejskie systemy norm prawnych we współczesnym 
kontekście pluralizmu etnicznego i religijnego.
Tłumaczenie Konrad Szulga
